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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

------------------------------------------------------JACOBSEN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC., a corporation; JELCO, INC.,
a corporation; and CENTRAL UTAH
WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT,
a body corporate and politic,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

Case No. 16208

STRUCTO-LITE ENGINEERING, INC.,
a corporation,
Defendant-Third-Party
Plaintiff-Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

INTRODUCTION
Appellant Structo-Lite Engineering, Inc. submits
this brief in reply to the brief of respondents Jacobsen
Construction Company, Inc., Jelco, Inc., and Central Utah
Water Conservancy District.

The purpose of this brief

is not to further expound on the arguments raised in
appellants' original brief, but to respond to new issues
raised in respondents' brief, as well as to clarify and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

correct some significant mistakes of law contained in
the respondents' brief.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
ASSUMPTION OF RISK AS A
COMPLETE BAR IS NOT
ELIMINATED BY COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE EXCEPT AS IT
TRACKS CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
RIGTRUP v. STRAWBERRY
WATER USERS ASSOCIATION IS
NOT CONTRARY.
Respondents go to great length in their brief
to show that appellant's reliance on the case of Rigtrup
v. Strawberry Water Users Association, 563 P.2d 1247
(Utah 1977) is misplaced; that rather than standing for
the proposition that the defense of assumption of the
risk may still operate as a complete bar in a negligence
action, the opinion of the Court requires that comparative
negligence be applied in assumption of risk type situations.

Appellant freely admits that the language of the

Court's opinion in Rigtrup is susceptible to such an
interpretation.

However, the opinion in Rigtrup is based

upon the assumption that the trial court applied the
comparative negligence statute in entering its verdict
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, 2
may contain errors.

of no cause of action against the plaintiff - Rigtrup.
Id. at 1250.

While this may certainly be the case, it

is equally as probable that, based upon the instructions
and the answers to the interrogatories on the special
verdict, the lower court in Rigtrup entered judgment
based on the fact that the jury found plaintiff had assumed the risk of the damages under an instruction which
stated that a finding of assumption of the risk would
bar recovery if the elements of that defense were present.
As pointed out by respondents, it makes a great
deal of difference in the application of the assumption
of risk doctrine whether the use of the doctrine is based
upon actual knowledge of the danger or merely failure to
discover it.

[Brief of Respondents at p. 14].

The

actual knowledge or "primary type" assumption of the risk
more closely tracks the issue of a defendant's duty,
while the should have discovered or "secondary type"
certainly equates with contributory negligence.

Presum-

ably respondents will not argue that the adoption of
comparative negligence has eliminated the legal requirement that a defendant must owe a duty to plaintiff before he is liable in a negligence action.

To read

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Ri9trup as abrogating this requirement simply because it
i• couched in terms of assumption of risk may create an
ideal situation for a plaintiff but appeliant contends
that it is clearly not the intent of the Supreme Court of
this State.
Respondents further argue that even if assumption of the risk remains as a defense and bar that
appellant is precluded from asserting it by appellant's
failure to specify during the course of the proceedings
whether appellant was relying on assumption of risk in
its "primary" or "secondary" sense.

Unfortunately for

respondents' position, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
only require that the defense be pled affirmatively as
"assumption of risk"; no requirement of pleading by
degree is stated.

Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil Pro-

cedure.
In the course of discovery procedures, and as
a result of appellant's proposed instructions to the
jury, respondents should have been aware of the fact that
appellant intended to raise the doctrine as a defense at
trial.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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POINT II
UTAH CASE LAW ESTABLISHES
THAT ASSUMPTION OF RISK IS
A DEFENSE TO A CLAIM FOR
BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY.
Respondents argue that assumption of the risk
is no defense in an action for breach of express warranty.
Finding no Utah cases on point, respondents cite a Kansas
case, Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 214 Kan. 311, 521
P.2d 281 (1974) in support of its assertion.

A closer

reading of that opinion shows that respondents' reliance
therein is misplaced.

The quotation from that opinion on

page 18 of respondents' brief is taken completely out of
context.

The language quoted, when taken with the body

of the opinion, does not lay down a general rule that
assumption of risk and contributory negligence are not
defenses to an action for breach of an express warranty,
but only that based upon the factual irregularities of
that particular case the defenses were not assertible
against those particular plaintiff-buyers.

On the con-

trary, the opinion in Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring
reaffirms and cites the Kansas Supreme Court opinion in
Huebert v. Federal Pacific Electric Co., Inc., 208 Kan.
720, 494 P.2d 1210 (1972) which concluded that assumption
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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of the risk

1!

a valid defense to an action based on an

expr••• warranty.
P.2d at 292.

Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 521

Respondents' own authority simply sub-

•tantiates the appellant's earlier stated position.
A reasonable construction of Utah case law
leads to a similar conclusion.

In Vernon v. Lake Motors,

26 U.2d 269, 488 P.2d 302 (1971), the plaintiff Vernon
sued defendant Lake Motors and Ford Motor Company for
damages sustained when plaintiff's new automobile caught
fire.

The suit was based on breach of an express warranty

given by the manufacturer and passed on by the dealer.
Defendants asserted that plaintiff had assumed the risk
of the damages sustained by using the automobile despite
knowledge of a defect therein.
The Supreme Court ruled that the knowing, voluntary, and unreasonable use of a dangerous product is
a recognized defense to an express warranty action.
at 305.

Id.

Appellant realizes, and the court pointed out,

that the recognized defense was the form of assumption
of risk which tracks contributory negligence.

However,

the court did not indicate that other forms of assumption of risk are not valid defenses, the inference cerSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
6 may contain errors.

tainly being that they are.

Vernon v. Lake Motors sup-

ports such inference since the court held that under
the factual setting therein there was a jury question
as to whether the use of the automobile by the plaintiff,
despite knowledge of a defect, was an unreasonable or
reasonable use.

Cf. Leishman v. Kamis Valley Lumber

Company, 19 U.2d 150, 427 P.2d 747 (1967) [without using
the term assumption of the risk the court implied that
use of a product with knowledge of a defect is a valid
defense to an action for breach of express warranty).
If assumption of risk truly remains as a
complete bar in a negligence action, the foregoing
authorities dictate that it may be used to bar an action
based on not only negligence but on breach of an express
warranty.
POINT III
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE
HIS DISCRETION BY ALLOWING
APPELLANT TO AMEND ITS &~NDED
ANSWER AT THE Titffi OF THE
TRIAL.

In their brief respondents assert that the trial
court erred in allowing respondent to amend its amended
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
7 administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

answer to set forth the defenses of assumption of risk
and contributory negligence on the first day of trial.
[Respondents' Brief at p. 19).

They also contend that

the failure to raise assumption of the risk and contributory negligence in a responsive pleading constitutes a
waiver of the defenses under Rule 12(a) Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure since the exception contained in Rule
lS(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is inapplicable in
this particular factual instance.

In support respondents

cite the Utah Supreme Court cases of General Insurance
Company of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d
502 (Utah 1976) and Cheney v. Rucker, 14 U.2d 205, 381
P. 2d 86 (1963).
Once again respondents' own authority undermines their argument.

Under Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure, any party may

make a motion at any time

to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence.
The parties may, by express consent,
or by the introduction of evidence
without objection, amend the pleadings
at will.
During the trial if a party
expressly requests leave to amend the
conformed pleadings to the proof adduced and to reflect issues raised by
either expressed or implied consent,
such leave should be granted.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
8 OCR, may contain errors.

The first part of Rule lS(b)
should be contrasted with the second
part where an amendment is offered
during trial in response to an objection to evidence, in such a case,
the standards set forth in the
second part of Rule lS(b) will apply,
viz., leave may be granted in absence
of prejudice, undue delay, or laches.
General Insurance Company of America v. Carnicero Dynesty
Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 505-06.
Cheney v. Rucker, 14 U.2d 205, 381 P.2d 86
(1963) indicates how Rules B(c) and lS(b) interrelate.
Plaintiff also raises the procedural point that since defendants did
not plead the subsequent agreement as
an affirmative defense, they should not
have been permitted to rely thereon.
It is true, as plaintiff insists, that
Rule 8(c) U.R.C.P., requires that affirmative defenses be pleaded.
It is
a good rule whose purpose is to have
the issues to be tried clearly framed.
But it is not the only rule in the book
of Rules of Civil Procedure. They
must all be looked to in the light of
their even more fundamental purpose of
liberalizing both pleading and procedure to the end that the parties are
afforded the privilege of presenting
whatever legitimate contentions they
have pertaining to their dispute. What
they are entitled to is notice of the
issues raised and an opportunity to
meet them. When this is accomplished,
that is all that is required.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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JA•

at 91.

Under such rationale the court in Cheney

affiraed a ruling of the lower court that the defendant
be allowed to amend his pleadings: the trial court was

held not to have abused the discretion it held over the
amendment procedure since the complaining party was
apparently unconvincing in showing how he had been disadvantaged and, further, he made no request for a continuance.
The aforecited cases clearly dispell respondents point of contention.

Respondents clearly had

notice of appellant's intent.
both defenses.

The original answer raised

The amended answer pled comparative negli-

gence which encompasses contributory negligence.

Defend-

ant could have waited until some objection was made at trial
as to the evidence it sought to have admitted before moving to make the amendment.

In light of the rules propounded

in General Insurance Company of America and Cheney, the
court would have the discretion to allow the amendment at
that time as well.

If per chance respondents had failed to

object at trial, the defenses would be deemed tried by
implied consent and thereby become a part of the pleadings.
10
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Appellant's motion at the start of trial vaa
made at that time rather than later during the trial to
provide the Court adequate opportunity to avoid any prejudice to the other party.

Respondents' argument regard-

ing the manner in which they were prejudiced by appellant's
motion was unconvincing to the lower court.

It is also

interesting to note that respondents did not request any
continuance despite the "extremely prejudicial" effect
which they alleged appellant's motion would have upon its
case.

In fact, respondents represented to the court that

the court could reserve its ruling on the matter since it
would have no effect upon its trial preparation.

[R.

sso-

52].

In retrospect it is extremely difficult to see
any way in which the court's exercise

of discretion

hindered respondents in the presentation of their case.
Respondents own actions in the wake of appellant's motion
indicate that their assertion of prejudice was clearly
more one of form than substance.

In light of the attend-

ant circumstances and their application to the law, it
is evident that the lower court exercised its discretion
properly and that the problem was dealt with at the most
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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expeditious time possible.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY
SUBMITTED THE ISSUES OF
ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE TO
THE JURY AND THE VERDICT
RETURNED BY THE JURORS SUBSTANTIATES THE PROPRIETY OF
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S ACTION.
In Point IV of their brief, respondents assert
that the trial judge erred in not directing the jurors,
by way of instruction, that respondents had not assumed
the risk of injury.

In Point V, the respondents make a

similar argument with respect to directing the issue of
respondents' contributory negligence.

On both points

respondents contend that, as a matter of law, the evidence
adduced at trial failed to establish either defense.
In order to properly address respondents'
argument it is imperative to put it in the context of the
standard to be used by a trial court in making a ruling
on a request for a directed verdict.
ruling

~pon

In making its

a motion for a directed verdict as to an

issue or issues, the trial court is obliged to view the
evidence advanced to prove the issue in a light most
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may
12 contain errors.

favorable to the party against whom the directed verdict
is sought.

Anderson v. Gribble, 3 U.2d 68, 513 P.2d 432,

434 (1973).

This means that the trial court must take

all the testimony on point, as well as any reasonable
inferences which tend to prove the case of the party
against whom the directed verdict is sought, as true.

It

must also disregard any conflicts in the evidence which
cut against the position of such party.

Koer v. Mayfair

Markets, 19 u.2d 339, 431 P.2d 566, 568 (1967).

If after

reviewing the evidence and inferences therefrom in such
light, any doubts the trial court may have as to what
action is appropriate are to be resolved in favor of
submitting the issues to the jury.

Smith v. Franklin,

14 u.2d 16, 376 P.2d 541, 544 (1962).

The trial court

must bear in mind its duty in a jury trial to submit to
the jury any theory of the party which is supported by
some evidence.
664, 666

(1966).

Hall v. Blackham, 18 U.2d 164, 417 P.2d
Only in the most extreme circumstances

should an issue be taken from the jury.
Once the trial court exercises its on-the-spot
judgment and submits the issue to a jury, its decision

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to do •o will only be upset by a reviewing court under

the most extreme circumstances.

In reviewing the trial

court's decision as to a directed verdict, the Supreme
Court will look at the trial court's decision in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and will
afford such party the benefit of all possible inferences
which may have been considered by the lower court.

Curtis

v. Harmon Electronics, Inc., 575 P.2d 1044, 1046 (1978).
The trial court's decision in the present instance was shown to be justified when the jury returned
its special verdict finding that not only were respondents
contributorily negligent but that they had assumed the
risk of the damages sustained.
Jury verdict's are not to be easily upset.

In

light of the jury's specific findings, any attack upon
the verdict or the actions of the trial court with regard
thereto must overcome the strong presumption of verity
afforded such findings and actions by the reviewing court.
Bezner v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 897,
901 (Utah 1976).

14
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The reviewing court is to afford the verdict
of the jury all possible presumptions in its favor.

The

court is obliged to assume that the jury properly followed the given instructions.

Brown v. Johnson, 24 U.24 388,

472 P.2d 942 (1970).

All facts are to be reviewed in

favor of the verdict.

Barlow Upholstery & Furniture Co.

v. Emmel, 533 P.2d 900, 902 (1975).

The verdict is not

to be upset unless, after taking all of the evidence and
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, it appears that the verdict is
entirely without foundation and evidence and that the
determinations of the jurors are so fragmentary and insubstantial no reasonable mind could have reached such
a conclusion.

Porter v. Price, 11 U.2d 80, 355 P.2d 66,

67 (1960); Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325, 1329 (1975).
When the foregoing legal principles are applied
to the facts herein it becomes readily apparent that the
trial judge acted properly in submitting the issues of
respondents assumption of the risk and contributory negligence to the jury and that the findings of the jury must
be sustained on this appeal.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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As to the doctrine of assumption of risk there
1•, at the very least, "some evidence" in the record to
validate both the submission of that issue' to the jury and
the jury verdict.

Respondent Jacobsen Construction Company

felt from the outset that fiberglass was improperly
specified for holding tanks of this size.

[R. 752].

Various supervisors and officers visited the Structo-Lite
yard during construction of the tanks and noticed various
defects in the construction and also that some components
were missing.

[R. 843, 851, 1166-68].

And despite reports

from American Testing Lab stating that the clamping procedures used by appellant were "hit and miss"

[R. 986-87],

Jacobsen did not require appellant to perform any tests on
the tanks.

[R.

903, 1170].

When delivered, the tanks still contained many
of the imperfections and irregularities observed by the
Jacobsen people earlier and some were not even complete
at the time they were delivered.

[R. 1171-72].

Hydrostatic tests run by respondent-Jacobsen's
employees revealed many leaks in several of the tanks
when filled with water to a depth of only three to four
feet.

[R. 939, 950, 1133].

Yet despite knowledge of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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these wide-ranging problems and irregularities, and while
also knowing that chemical alum was much heavier than
water [R. 1178), the tanks were never tested with alum.
[R. 914).

After the hydrostatic testing was completed

and at least some of the leaks were repaired, the tanks
still had visible expansion humps in various areas.
[R.

1179).
Respondent Conservancy District had similar

knowledge of the problems with the tanks.

Never confid-

ent in the design of the tanks [R. 1082), the District
never chose ro tun a tension test [R. 1083) while admittedly knowing that appellant wasn't running quality
tests of any kind.

[R. 1071).

The District also re-

viewed the American Testing Lab's reports detailing the
"hit and miss" clamping procedures the inspector observed [R. 986) and personally observed deficiencies in
the fiberglass application procedures.

[R. 987).

The District was thoroughly familiar with the
specifications for the tanks [R. 1056] and knew that
tests would have to be made.

[R. 1058].

The chief

engineer for the District had visited the Structo-Lite
site and observed similar irregularities to those found
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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by the Jacobsen inspectors.

[R. 1060].

The District

knew of the leaks found during the hydrostatic testing.
[R. 994].

And yet while knowing that alum would be

heavier than water, it too chose not to run any tests
using a heavier solution prior to putting the tanks in
operation.
Respondents' actions might seem unreasonable,
given their choice to proceed to fill the tanks with alum
despite the extent of the known defects and their admitted suspicions concerning Structo-Lite manufacturing
processes.

[R. 1060].

However, the respondents' actions

must be put into the context of the time pressures they
were working under.

Respondents had experienced signi-

ficant problems with getting appellant to deliver the
tanks on schedule.

Delays were costly and concern was

mounting as to whether or not the tanks would be delivered in time to complete the roof of the building before
winter arrived.

[R. 1131-33].

It is at least a jury

question as to whether or not respondents' actions were
not entirely reasonable in accepting the tanks in an uncompleted state with the thought in mind that repairs
could be made following installation and roofing.

After

the tanks were in and the hydrostatic testing in the
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Spring revealed, once again, the defective nature of the
tanks, the decision to fill the tanks with alum and
commence operation of the facility without further testing may also be viewed as a reasonable choice in light
of the need to put the plant in immediate operation to
prepare for an anticipated serious summer drought.

(R.

998-99].
Respondents' knowledge

of the seriously del

ficient nature of the planning surrounding the use of
fiberglass tanks and the defects contained in the tanks
themselves, when coupled with an arguably reasonable
rationale for making such choice, compel a conclusion
that the issue was properly given to the jury and the
respondents' own proposed instructions to which, of course,
respondents raise no objection.

!/

While actual knowledge is usually required before one
is said to have assumed the risk of injury, an actual
statement that one subjectively knew of the dangers
involved is not always necessary.
In order to prevent
a plaintiff from eliminating his responsibility under the
doctrine by merely testifying that he did not know of
the risk, many cases have said,in effect,that a plaintiff is not to be believed where he says he did not
comprehend a
risk which must have been quite clear and
obvious to him.
In effect, an objective element enters
the case.
See W. Prosser, Law of Torts, §68 at P· 448.
The case at hand certainly must fall within this category.
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Respondents' contention that the jury could
not possibly find them contributorily negligent upon the
facts at hand not only stretches the imagination but is
premised upon a misstatement of authority.

Respondents

allege that they were not contributorily negligent since
they did not have actual knowledge that use of the tanks
as fabricated

was dangerous.

[Respondents' Brief at p. 35].

By their argument respondents seek to equate the requirements of the defenses of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk, apparently in a hope to strengthen
their earlier argument that assumption of risk has been
swallowed up into comparative negligence.

In support of

their position that one must have knowledge of a danger
to be deemed contributorily negligent, respondents cite
Rogalski v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 3 U.2d 203, 282 P.2d
304

(1955).

ln Rogalski the plaintiff was injured when

he fell into a vat of caustic acid while steam cleaning
his employer's truck.

Testimony at trial would have

allowed the jury to conclude that plaintiff did not see
the vat because of the steam.

Defendant appealed the

verdict for plaintiff on the ground that the court should
have found plaintiff guilty as a matter of law.
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On appeal the Supreme Court, citing Knox v.
~·

229 P.2d 874, 876 (1951) restated the general rule

that "a plaintiff will not be held to have been guilty
of contributory negligence if it appears that he had

•

no knowledge or means of knowledge of the danger
Rogalski v. Phillips Petroleum Co., supra, at 308
[emphasis added].

The court's language is merely another

way of stating the traditional "knew or should have
known" bedrock test for contributory negligence.

That

such was the intent in Rogalski is substantiated by the
court's affirmation of the trial court's verdict on the
basis that it was for the jury to determine whether or
not plaintiff Rogalski exercised reasonable care and caution in continuing around the truck, using the fender as
a guide, while unable to see due to the cloud of steam.
Id.

at 3 08.
When applying the above-stated rule to the

facts of the matter at hand it becomes apparent that
even if, arguendo, the evidence and testimony recited
above with regard to assumption of the risk is deemed insufficient to establish that defense due to, ~· lack
of knowledge, there can be little doubt that such evidence,
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and the inferences to be derived thereform, overwhelmingly corroborate the finding of the jury that respondents
were contributorily negligent, i.e., that they should
have been aware of the danger.

CONCLUSION
Respondents have failed in their attempts to
show any reason why the verdict returned by the jury
should be overturned as to the findings of assumption
of risk and contributory negligence.

There is certainly

credible evidence in the record which, when taken with
the inferences which may reasonably be derived therefrom,
substantiate the jury's finding that not only were
respondents contributorily negligent in using the defective fiberglass tanks, but that they accepted a calculated risk by pressing the defective tanks into use
in order to

~eet

their time table, whle having knowledge

of the seriously defective nature of such tanks.
It is tortured reasoning at best to suggest
that the Legislature's adoption of comparative negligence
abrogated the principle that there is no duty owed to a
person who voluntarily subjects himself to a known danger.
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Whether such action is called "primary assumption of
risk", "assumption of the risk", or "lack of duty,•
makes no difference.
Pending a contrary decision by this Court,
Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water Users Association, when viewed in light of the authorities and principles cited
herein, still appears to allow a defendant to assert the
defense of assumption of risk as a complete bar in not
only a negligence action but, in an action for breach of
express warranty as well.

Appellant therefore respect-

fully contends that the trial court in this matter erred
in its failure to grant appellant a judgment of no cause
of action against respondents to which they were entitled
based upon the special verdict returned by a properly
instructed jury.
Respectfully submitted this

~ay

of January,

1980.

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By

i:/~6._
: James Clegg

------Attorneys for Defendant StructoLite
Inc.
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two copies of the Reply Brief of Appellant to Arthur H.
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